Values, Voice and Virtue: The New British Politics

£9.9
FREE Shipping

Values, Voice and Virtue: The New British Politics

Values, Voice and Virtue: The New British Politics

RRP: £99
Price: £9.9
£9.9 FREE Shipping

In stock

We accept the following payment methods

Description

This was compounded by geography. By prioritising the new graduate elite, as Jeremy Corbyn learned in 2019, Labour was left heavily dependent on voters who are simply too narrowly concentrated in the cities and university towns to win large majorities in a first-past-the-post system. Book Review: Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain by Robert Ford and Matthew J. Goodwin Perhaps director Mia Hansen-Løve could have given us a heroine with more agency, and she relies a little too much on Léa Seydoux’s natural sardonic hauteur to protect her character from soppiness. But there is such a lovely chemistry between Seydoux and Greggory, and between her and Poupaud there is real erotic languor and romance. Peter Bradshaw Liberals in the media, thinktanks and universities certainly help shape the national conversation. But, again, the issue is not nearly as straightforward as Goodwin suggests. He points to studies showing that most journalists are left wing. Yet, the media coverage of, and national conversation about, say, “stop the boats” policy or the Rwanda scheme has hardly been “left wing”. On the contrary, language once confined to the far right is now casually exploited by mainstream commentators. One could plausibly argue that someone like Goodwin himself shapes public debate more than most of the “new elite” to whom he points. Both these books opened my world view to an entirely different way of thinking, helping me not just to understand the patriotic/populist argument but (to my amazement) find myself agreeing with large portions of it.

This obsession with a ‘new elite’ hides the real roots of

From there, my journey of discovery continued, through studies of the rising extremism in the western education system in books such as The Coddling of the American Mind: How Good Intentions and Bad Ideas Are Setting Up a Generation for Failure, to insightful books such as The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics, and Despised: Why the Modern Left Loathes the Working Class. All of these titles (and lots more on my “blue” shelf) helped me, as a lifelong Labour voter, to understand and fully embrace the argument that the vast majority of the working class has been, not just completely let down, but wilfully abandoned by each of the the modern mainstream political parties. Bortun summarizes that while the book has received both praise and criticism in mainstream and on social media, "one shortcoming of most reactions has been to treat the book as a scholarly work". Instead, he suggests, Goodwin uses "widely accepted observations" such as the erosion of differences between the Conservative and Labour Parties, a relative decline in social mobility and the rise of a broadly liberal middle-class, "to perform a series of logical and empirical leaps in the attempt to push a very transparent political agenda." [9] I worry that things are not going to get better any time soon as there is still no real dialog just hot air. The crux of this analysis is the counter-revolution being waged by the ‘traditionalists’ who feel that they have no say in the running of Britain and are looked upon with contempt by the ‘new elite’ who see themselves as morally and cognitively superior to the traditionalists and are embarrassed/ashamed of Britain and its history. The new elite cleaves to supra-national (and undemocratic) institutions such as the EU and cannot accept any rejection of their preferences further alienating the ‘traditionalists’ by labelling them racists, bigots, homophobes, Nazis and whatever else is available to them in the pejorative lexicon of the left.

Select a format:

Goodwin replies to Cummings over new political party". Reaction. 16 August 2023 . Retrieved 26 August 2023. A really key driver of populist politics is how you construct this notion of a cultural elite,” said Savage. “You say: they’re out of touch, but they’re very influential, and they’re working to thwart the will of the people. To be sure, there are people in universities, and journalism, and other places who have a degree of power – but they are not as cohesive or as dominant as that view suggests.”

Values, Voice and Virtue: The New British Politics by Matthew Values, Voice and Virtue: The New British Politics by Matthew

I read Values, Voice and Virtue book after reading Douglas Murray's The Strange Death of Europe, which I read a few months ago and came away from with the sense that immigration means something different in Europe than it does in the United States, and I went into the reason for that in my review of that book. Ultimately, Labour has done remarkably well to stage such a recovery, but in both Britain and beyond it will be these lingering divides over values, voice and virtue that will determine whether this fragile recovery morphs into a much stronger and more sustainable position of power. Arguably, I had no need to read this book. Having had my world view up-ended already, my time would have been better spent reading something to challenge my current beliefs. But V,V&V has been included in an online reading group, so I figured I may as well have a look at it.I have never fully understood what Brexit was about, i.e., why it caught the attention of British voters when it did, why it was such a polarizing issue in 2016 when ten years earlier it had not been forefront in the minds of British voters, and what the British national dialogue has really been talking about when they say they are talking about Brexit. I have thought about MAGA in the same context, i.e., why did it happen when it did? What does it say about the United States that Trump was able to capture some component of the American population that he probably would have not been able to do a decade earlier?

Financial Times where next for the Conservative party? - Financial Times

The national, public funded broadcaster the BBC is experiencing record levels of distrust. At a time when Britain could be said to be one of the most tolerant countries in the most tolerant era of western history (discrimination by most metrics is at an all time low) a manic agenda is being pushed on the public. 60% live in fear of contravening the latest speech codes and see “political correctness” as undermining their free speech. Goodwin rounds up many right leaning perspectives in one book, which is good. I particularly liked the inclusion of McWhorter’s work. There’s not clearly much new stuff here though, and I found the pace a bit dry. I’m left wanting a deeper exploration of the moral frameworks uniting these perspectives; but perhaps that’s a credit to the book. Not a bad read, but I’m not rushing to recommend it to all my friends. There are several premises in Goodwin’s argumentation that, albeit not original, one would struggle to disagree with. For one, he is right to point out the erosion of significant differences between the two main political parties, Conservative and Labour, which have coalesced around the liberal consensus set up by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. He is also correct in linking that to the relative reduction in social mobility (from accountancy to architecture to acting), coupled with the rise of a new middle class that has benefitted from that liberal consensus and that has been increasingly detached from other social groups. Indeed, a significant part of this social group displays a broad liberal orientation on both economic and cultural matters. However, Goodwin uses these widely accepted observations to perform a series of logical and empirical leaps in the attempt to push a very transparent political agenda. Matthew Goodwin, acclaimed political scientist and co-author of National Populism, shows that the reason is not economic hardship, personalities or dark money. Towards the end, Goodwin laughs at people who continue to see class as important in British politics. He must have forgotten some of his earlier chapters.

Retailers:

By contrast, the “traditional values” displayed by conservatives are presented as almost natural, despite the vast literature showing how notions such as “national identity” or “whiteness” may be constructed in a top-down way that benefits the elite. Goodwin’s argumentation bears another contradiction: if the new elite imposes its progressive values on the rest of society, was that not the case also with the old elite and its traditionalist values? Indeed, Goodwin fails to explain what exactly is wrong with questioning received knowledge about the past, the Empire, British identity etc. Shouldn’t social scientists welcome this kind of critical interrogation and debate? Isn’t history a science to be rewritten in the light of new evidence and arguments? It is true that a new generation of thinkers and activists has helped consolidate a culture more given to identitarian thinking and more censorious in its outlook (though also one that is less racist, more accepting of women’s equality and more welcoming of gay people). To confuse that, however, with the claim that it constitutes the new ruling class is to have a weak understanding of how power works and where it lies. An excellent book for understanding the current state of play in British politics. Matthew Goodwin argues that the economic liberalism of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government combined with the cultural liberalism of Tony Blair's New Labour regime has created a political culture in the United Kingdom that is now just as polarised as that of America or continental Europe. The divide is now mainly between the university-educated, socially liberal, and pro-mass immigration elite on the one hand and the culturally conservative national populists on the other. The latter group tend to be more right-wing on cultural issues, but more left-wing on economics. The book fails to demonstrate that the people occupying the most influential positions in British economic and political spheres share a “radically progressive” outlook

Values, Voice and Virtue: The New British Politics

Having made all the arguments here for more than half a decade, he needed a new peg on which to hang them. He's plumped for a clear division between the 'old elite' and the 'new elite'. Apparently, the 'new elite' are different from the old because they have Oxbridge educations, have a 'loud and dominant' voice in institutions, and have a sense of moral righteousness that makes them believe they are superior to non-elites.If you believed academics are no longer relevant beyond their own professional bubble, Matthew Goodwin’s latest book has come to challenge that perception. Although it has been passionately praised and criticised across mainstream and social media, one shortcoming of most reactions has been to treat the book as a scholarly work. Kenan Malik wrote that Goodwin's argument that members of what he portrays as the "new elite", including Gary Lineker, Mehdi Hasan and Sam Freedman, shape people's lives more than figures such as Rishi Sunak or Andrew Bailey, the governor of the Bank of England "is, to put it politely, stretching credulity". [8] Similarly, Vladimir Bortun wrote that Goodwin "fails to demonstrate that the people occupying the most influential positions in British economic and political spheres share a “radically progressive” outlook." [9] Matthew D'Ancona asked "Are Hugh Grant and Emma Watson really running Britain into the ground?", arguing "Maybe it helps the populist right and their cheerleaders to believe such nonsense." [10] Malik asserted that it was plausible that "Goodwin himself shapes public debate more than most of the "new elite" to whom he points". [8] Sunder Katwala suggested that Goodwin employs evidence selectively and argued that "The wish to rebut one-dimensional caricatures of the Leave tribe is a valid one, but Goodwin is not above dishing out caricatures of the other half of the country all the same." [11] Archie Bland has written that when critics point out that those in positions of political power have actively pursued the type of "anti-woke" politics that Goodwin approves of, "Goodwin and his allies argue that these developments are all part of a rearguard action to defend traditional values against an agenda driven by a shadowy minority" and that disagreement with this view is portrayed as "simply proof of their original thesis: that the new elite is out of touch." [12] Well-written and cogently argued ... [Goodwin] understands the broad forces that spurred the surprising changes and tumult in the politics of the West, and he writes about them without villainizing or heroizing ... a crucial one to read. Bo Winegard, Aporia I found this to be a fascinating and determinedly objective analysis of the changing political alignments in Britain today. It examines the widening gulf between the ‘new elite (typically liberal progressive graduates with left leaning views)that runs the country and its institutions and the ‘Traditionalist’ majority (mostly non-graduate, patriotic, culturally conservative). It charts the rise of this new elite over the past 60 years as they supplanted the old land owning, aristocratic elite of the previous era.



  • Fruugo ID: 258392218-563234582
  • EAN: 764486781913
  • Sold by: Fruugo

Delivery & Returns

Fruugo

Address: UK
All products: Visit Fruugo Shop